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Transactive Energy and Flexibility Provision in
Multi-microgrids using Stackelberg Game
Weiqi Hua, Member, IEEE, Hao Xiao, Member, IEEE, Wei Pei, Member, IEEE, Wei-Yu Chiu, Member, IEEE,
Jing Jiang, Member, IEEE, Hongjian Sun, Senior Member, IEEE and Peter Matthews
Abstract—Aggregating the demand side flexibility is essential
to complementing the inflexible and variable renewable energy
supply in achieving low carbon energy systems. Sources of
demand side flexibility, e.g., dispatchable generators, storages,
and flexible loads, can be structured in a form of microgrids and
collectively provided to utility grids through transactive energy in
local energy markets. This paper proposes a framework of local
energy markets to manage the transactive energy and facilitate
the flexibility provision. The distribution system operator aims
to achieve local energy balance by scheduling the operation of
multi-microgrids and determining the imbalance prices. Multiple
microgrid traders aim to maximise profits for their prosumers
through dispatching flexibility sources and participating in lo-
calised energy trading. The decision making and interactions
between a distribution system operator and multiple microgrid
traders are formulated as the Stackelberg game-theoretic prob-
lem. Case studies using the IEEE 69-bus distribution system
demonstrate the effectiveness of the developed model in terms of
facilitating the local energy balance and reducing the dependency
on the utility grids.
Index Terms—demand side flexibility, game theory, multi-
microgrid, prosumer, smart grid, transactive energy.
I. INTRODUCTION
CONVENTIONAL electricity systems are vertically inte-grated architecture in which the electricity generation,
transmission, and distribution are managed by centralised
authorities [1]. The deregulation of electricity systems enables
the transition towards liberalised electricity markets [2]. In
the liberalised electricity markets, such as the Great Britain
(GB) electricity market [3], electricity generation and supply
are decoupled, resulting in the competitive wholesale markets
and retail markets. Multiple suppliers buy electricity from
generators in the wholesale markets in order to satisfy the
electricity demand of their consumers in the retail markets.
The operation of power grids is distinct from the generation,
leading to independent transmission system operators (TSOs)
and distribution system operators (DSOs) [4].
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Regulations for decarbonising power systems support the
integration of distributed renewable energy sources (DRESs),
such as the roof-top solar panel. Conventional consumers
are able to actively produce, consume, and store energy
using these DRESs, advanced information and communication
technologies, and storage devices, giving them a new role of
prosumers [5]. In local energy markets, prosumers are able to
exchange electricity between each other and provide flexibility
to the utility grids, which brings additional revenues to pro-
sumers [6], improves local energy balance [7], and reduces
the needs for reinforcing power system infrastructures [8].
Nonetheless, accommodating the role of prosumers requires
flexible architectures of local energy markets.
Microgrids, as a self-sufficient energy system interconnect-
ing to distribution networks [9], [10], provide a solution
to the reliable integration of prosumers. The innovation of
transactive energy [11] in local electricity markets enables
prosumers to exchange both energy and capital between each
other within the same geographical region. To facilitate the
commercial relations between microgrids and local energy
markets, a virtual entity, microgrid trader [12], was designed
to manage the resources dispatch and energy trading for
a microgrid. As a neutral facilitator, the microgrid trader
encourages and aggregates the demand side flexibility from
dispatchable generators, storage devices, and flexible loads
[13] of its prosumers. These sources of demand side flexibility
can be aggregated and subsequently provided to the utility
grids for complementing the inflexible and variable renewable
energy sources on the generation side.
Managing the transactive energy and providing flexibility
from distribution networks have been well documented in the
literature. Typical approaches for managing the operations of
power systems and energy markets, e.g., energy dispatch, de-
mand side management, state estimation, and energy trading,
include the optimisation [14], [15], agent-based model [16],
[17], game theory [18]–[24], or combination of these ap-
proaches. The optimisation approach assists the stakeholders in
power systems or energy markets to find optimal decisions in
achieving certain targets, e.g., operational profits maximisation
and power losses minimisation. Marzband et al. [14] proposed
a smart transactive energy framework to dispatch flexibility
sources and allocate profits among microgrids using the devel-
oped optimisation approach, through which microgrids formed
a coalition to improve their competitiveness. Wang et al.
[15] designed a bi-level optimisation framework to coordinate
the transactive energy of microgrids with the operation of
distribution systems. The agent-based model simulates the
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actions and interactions of stakeholders in power systems or
energy markets, in order to analyse the behaviours of these
stakeholders and corresponding impacts on the whole systems.
Nunna and Srinivasan [16] proposed an agent-based approach
for managing the transactive energy, through which the surplus
energy supply or residual energy demand could be traded
in a transactive market. As flexibility sources, the flexible
demand and storage systems in microgrids were incorporated
into the operation of power systems to address the energy
imbalance. Janko and Johnson [17] developed a general multi-
agent method to assist the energy trading between microgrids
when they connect to the utility grids, for the purpose of
reducing the operational costs of microgrids.
Game-theoretic approaches have drawn increasing attention
for analysing the decision making and interactions of stake-
holders in local energy markets. The cooperative game enables
every stakeholder to gain benefits through participating the
game rather than acting independently [25]. Du et al. [18]
implemented a cooperative game-theoretic approach to model
the coordination among multiple microgrids in distribution
networks through forming one grand coalition. To improve the
reliability and operational efficiency of distribution networks,
researchers in [19] developed a coalitional game to incentivise
the localised energy transaction of microgrids. With respect to
the non-cooperative game, each stakeholder seeks to maximise
its own benefits and all stakeholders would reach an equilib-
rium outcome, at which no stakeholder wants to deviate [26].
In [20], generators, consumers, and retailers were modelled
as players by a non-cooperative game approach to analyse
interactions between distribution networks and microgrids. Fu
et al. [21] formulated a bi-level optimisation problem using
the non-cooperative game, by which the hybrid AC/DC distri-
bution network was at the higher level to control power flows
and multiple microgrids were at the lower level to manage the
energy storage systems. The Stackelberg game-theoretic model
features a sequential decision-making problem [22]. A leader
at a higher level initially determines its strategies. Followers
at the lower level subsequently formulate their responding
strategies. Liu et al. [23] implemented the Stackelberg game
to manage the energy sharing considering the stakeholders
of microgrid operator at the leader level and prosumers at
the follower level. In [24], a framework for power system
scheduling was designed using the Stackelberg game theory
to facilitate the penetration of renewable generation and carbon
reduction in energy consumption.
In the context of our proposed research, the DSO announces
the required flexibility prioritising the dispatch and responses
of multiple microgrid traders, in order to achieve the target
of local energy balance for the DSO and profit maximisation
for individual microgrid traders and their prosumers. The
Stackelberg game-theoretic approach can precisely capture
this sequential action process. For this reason, our research
modelled the decision making and interactions between the
DSO and multiple microgrid traders as a Stackelberg game.
Although extensive studies have been conducted, there exist
three primary research gaps as follows.
• Designing a structure of the local energy market to align
the interests of individual prosumers, e.g., their generating
profits, with the benefits of power systems, e.g., flexible
operation and local energy balance, is necessary, but missing
in the literature.
• How the DSO exploits the market innovation of trans-
active energy to facilitate the flexibility provision from pro-
sumers has not been investigated.
• When multiple microgrids in the same distribution net-
work exchange energy with each other, a pricing and clearing
mechanism needs to be designed.
By addressing these research gaps, this paper offers the
following contributions:
• A novel structure of local energy market is designed
to manage the transactive energy and facilitate the flexibility
provision from prosumers in microgrids.
• How the DSO facilitates the flexibility provision through
the transactive energy among multiple microgrid traders is
analysed by a Stackelberg game-theoretic model. The DSO
seeks for local energy balance by scheduling the operation
of microgrids and determining the imbalance prices, and
individual microgrid traders seek for maximising the profits
of their prosumers through dispatching flexibility sources and
energy trading.
• Case studies testify the benefits of the developed model
in terms of facilitating the transactive energy and flexibility
provision of microgrids, achieving the local energy balance,
and reducing the dependency on the utility grids.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II
formulates the framework of local energy markets by analysing
the objectives and decisions of the DSO and multiple micro-
grid traders. The interactions between these stakeholders are
modelled as the Stackelberg game-theoretic problem in Section
III. The results of case studies to show the effectiveness of the
designed framework are provided in Section IV, and Section
V draws the conclusion and discusses future works.
II. FRAMEWORK OF LOCAL ENERGY MARKETS
Fig. 1 shows the strategical decision making and interactions
between the DSO and multiple microgrid traders. The DSO
aims to achieve local energy balance through scheduling
the operation of multi-microgrid and determining imbalance
prices. Each microgrid trader aims to maximise profits for its
ensemble of prosumers through aggregating surplus flexibility
sources from its prosumers and participating in the transactive
energy to trade with other microgrid traders. This research
focuses on the day-ahead electricity markets.
Fig. 2 presents the relationship between power systems and
local energy markets. A group of geographically connected
prosumers (denoted by dots) forms a microgrid. The prosumers
include residential, commercial, and industrial consumers who
are able to produce energy on-site. Meanwhile, individual
prosumers own their flexibility sources including dispatchable
generators, electric vehicles, storage systems, and flexible
loads. First, prosumers belonging to the same microgrid can
share their flexibility sources with each other at agreed prices.
Second, after internal energy sharing among prosumers, a
microgrid trader helps its prosumers aggregate the surplus
energy supply or demand, and exchange with other micro-
grids. A microgrid can either connect to the utility grids or
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Fig. 1. Strategical decision making and interactions between the distribution
system operator and microgrid traders.
disconnect and operate independently in an islanded mode
[27]. In the context of our research, only the connected mode
is considered for the purpose of flexibility provision to the
distribution networks or transmission networks.
Remark: From the power system level, if a microgrid still
has surplus supply/demand after the transactive energy, this
surplus energy can be either exported/imported to/from the
utility grids, or curtailed/unsatisfied. From the prosumer level,
they negotiate the prices of energy sharing between each
other under predefined auction mechanisms. Both the power
system level and prosumer level are beyond the scope of
this research, since this research focuses on the roles and
relationship between the DSO and microgrid traders.
Let N represent the set of buses, i.e., prosumers, within a
microgrid, indexed by n ∈ N , and M represent the set of
microgrids, indexed by m ∈ M. The total numbers of buses
and microgrids are denoted by |N | and |M|, respectively.
A. The Role of Microgrid Trader
A microgrid trader seeks to maximise the profits for its
prosumers through providing three functions: 1) helping its
sellers and buyers within the same microgrid match with each
other, 2) helping the DSO balance local energy by facilitating
the flexibility sources, and 3) aggregating surplus generation
or consumption to trade with other microgrids. First, the costs
of operating flexibility sources by individual prosumers are
modelled as follows:
• Dispatchable generators: The operational costs of a dis-
patchable generator can be modelled as follows [28]:
cDG,n,t = αDG,n · (pDG,n,t)2 + βDG,n · pDG,n,t + γDG,n, (1)
where cDG,n,t is the operational costs of a dispatchable gener-
ator connected to the bus n at the scheduling time t, pDG,n,t is
the power output of a dispatchable generator connected to the
bus n at the scheduling time t, and αDG,n, βDG,n, and γDG,n are
the cost coefficients of a dispatchable generator connected to
the bus n. The operation of a dispatchable generator is subject
to the power output constraint as
pDG,n,t ≤ pmaxDG,n, (2)
where pmaxDG,n is the maximum power output of a dispatchable
generator connected to the bus n.
• Electric vehicles: A prosumer who owns an electric
vehicle is able to sell the electricity to the power grids when
the electric vehicle is inactive. The costs of the vehicle-to-grid
can be modelled as follows according to [28]:
cEV,n,t = αEV,n · (pEV,n,t)2 + βEV,n · pEV,n,t + γEV,n, (3)
where cEV,n,t is the costs of the vehicle-to-grid connected to
the bus n at the scheduling time t, pEV,n,t is the power ex-
ported from the electric vehicle to the bus n at the scheduling
time t, and αEV,n, βEV,n, and γEV,n are the cost coefficients
of the vehicle-to-grid connected to the bus n. Considering
the capacity limit of power grids, the constraint of maximum
power exported from an electric vehicle holds as
pEV,n,t ≤ pmaxEV,n, (4)
where pmaxEV,n is the maximum power exported from an electric
vehicle connected to the bus n.
• Storage system: Let eS,n,t denote the state of charge of
a storage system of the bus n at the scheduling time t, and
∆pS,n,t denote the charging or discharging rate of the storage
system of the bus n at the scheduling time t. The positive
value of ∆pS,n,t indicates the power is charged to the storage
system, and the negative value of ∆pS,n,t indicates the power
is discharged from the storage system. We have
∆pS,n,t ·∆t = eS,n,t − eS,n,t−1, (5)
where ∆t is the scheduling interval.
The state of charge should be restricted by the capacity limit
as
0 ≤ eS,n,t ≤ emaxS , (6)
where emaxS is the maximum storage capacity.
The charging or discharging rate of the storage system
should be limited by the maximum value as
|∆pS,n,t| ≤ ∆pmaxS , (7)
where ∆pmaxS is the maximum charge or discharge rate.
• Demand side management: The approaches of the demand
side management in the context of this research include the
load shifting and load curtailment. The load shifting aims to
schedule the consumption period of the shiftable loads while
remaining total consumption during the scheduling horizon
unchanged, in responding to dynamic retail electricity pricing
signals [29]. The load curtailment reduces the total consump-
tion level of curtailable loads [30]. Both the load shifting
and load curtailment would cause inconvenience for electricity
consumers, which can be described by the disutility function
[28] in a monetary manner as:
cDSM,n,t = αDSM,n · (∆dn,t)2 +βDSM,n ·∆dn,t + γDSM,n, (8)
where cDSM,n,t is the costs of demand side management in
the bus n at the scheduling time t, ∆dn,t is the shifted or
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Fig. 2. Schematic illustration of the relation between power systems and local energy markets.
curtailed consumption in the bus n at the scheduling time t,
and αDSM,n, βDSM,n, and γDSM,n are the cost coefficients of
the demand side management in the bus n.
For the load curtailment, we have∑
t∈T
∆dn,t ·∆t > 0 (9)
For the load shifting, we have∑
t∈T
∆dn,t ·∆t = 0, (10)
where T is the scheduling horizon. For the time interval of
0.5 h, we have (∆t, |T |) = (0.5, 48).
Next, a microgrid trader aggregates the flexible power to
meet local demand of its prosumers. The aggregate flexible




pDG,n,t + pEV,n,t −∆pS,n,t +∆dn,t, (11)
where pFL,m,t is the aggregated flexible power of the microgrid
m at the scheduling time t.
Let pn,t denote the power generation from non-dispatchable
sources, e.g., solar, of the bus n at the scheduling time t, and
dn,t denote the power demand of the bus n at the scheduling
time t. The net power of a microgrid after meeting the local
demand of its prosumers can be described as
pNET,m,t = pFL,m,t +
∑
n∈N
(pn,t − dn,t) , (12)
where pNET,m,t is the net power of the microgrid m at
the scheduling time t after meeting the local demand of
its prosumers. A positive value of pNET,m,t indicates that
the microgrid m has the surplus power to be sold to other
microgrids as an electricity seller; A negative value of pNET,m,t
indicates that the microgrid m has the surplus demand to be
met by other microgrids as an electricity buyer.
The profits of a microgrid are the difference between the













where fp,m is the objective function of profits of the microgrid
m, and πFL,m,t is the selling price (when pNET,m,t > 0) or
buying price (when pNET,m,t < 0) of the microgrid trader m
at the scheduling time t.
If all microgrids in the distribution network still have surplus
supply, they can sell this surplus supply to the DSO at a price
lower than the selling prices between microgrids. This lower
price is defined as the system sell price (SSP). If all microgrids
in distribution networks still have surplus demand, they can
buy this surplus demand from the DSO at a price higher than
the buying prices between microgrids. This higher price is
defined as the system buy price (SBP). Both the SSP and SBP
determined by the DSO are belong to the imbalance prices
[31]. Hence, the selling or buying prices between microgrids
are not lower than the SSP and not higher than the SBP
as shown in Eq. (14). Otherwise, a microgrid would prefer
to exchange with the DSO, driven by the objective of profit
maximisation.
πDSSP,t ≤ πFL,m,t ≤ πDSBP,t, (14)
where πDSSP,t is the SSP at the scheduling time t, and πDSBP,t
is the SBP at the scheduling time t.
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Therefore, the problem profit maximisation of a microgrid






(2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), and (14).
B. The Role of Distribution System Operator
The DSO aims to achieve local energy balance through
scheduling the operation of microgrids and determining the
imbalance prices. First, the net power of the distribution







where fB is the objective function of local energy balance of
the distribution network.
The DSO also maintains system constraints including the
electric power balance, line flow constraints, apparent power
constraints, voltage constraints, voltage angle constraints, and
thermal power constraints as in [32].
Next, the DSO determines the imbalance prices to trade sur-
plus supply or demand with microgrid traders. The imbalance











m∈M pNET,m,t < 0,
(17)
where ε is the coefficient of imbalance price.
Therefore, the problem of achieving local energy balance






III. STACKELBERG GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH
This section introduces the proposed Stackelberg game-
theoretic problem for modelling the interactions between the
DSO and its multiple microgrid traders. A solution to the
game-theoretic problem is subsequently developed based on
the artificial immune system.
A. Problem Formulation
The interactions between a DSO and multiple microgrid
traders are formulated as a Stackelberg game-theoretic prob-
lem, by which the DSO is at the leader level with strategies
of the operational scheduling for microgrids and imbalance
prices, |M| microgrid traders are at the follower level with
strategies of dispatching flexibility sources and energy trading
as responses. The procedures of the Stackelberg game between
the DSO and |M| microgrid traders are described as follows:





NET,m,t by solving its optimisation problem based
on the predicted generation and consumption.
0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12



















Microgrid Trader as Seller
Microgrid Trader as Buyer
Market Clearing Price
Fig. 3. Schematic illustration of how to determine the market clearing price
for multiple microgrid traders through generating the curves of the aggregated
supply and demand. The selling prices are arranged in the ascending order.
The buying prices are arranged in the descending order.
Step 2: Receiving the information of required flexibility
from the DSO, each microgrid trader decides its responding
strategies of dispatching flexibility sources for individual pro-
sumers, through solving its optimisation problem. The optimal









,∀n ∈ N .
Step 3: Multiple microgrid traders help their prosumers
trade aggregated surplus supply or demand p⋆NET,m,t at the
optimal selling or buying prices, denoted as π⋆FL,m,t, yielded by
solving their own optimisation problems. The auction of mi-
crogrid traders is proceeded by the double auction mechanism
[33]. The selling prices are arranged in the ascending order
and the buying prices are arranged in the descending order,
to generate the aggregated supply and demand curves. An
example of the aggregated supply and demand curves is shown
in Fig. 3. The market clearing price of multiple microgrid
traders is the intersection point of two curves. The microgrid
traders negotiate with each other by adjusting their selling
or buying prices as shown in Eq. (19), until all unmatched
supply or demand has been cleared, at which the Stackelberg
equilibrium is reached.{
π′FL,m,t = πFL,m,t −∆πFL,m,t if pNET,m,t > 0,
π′FL,m,t = πFL,m,t +∆πFL,m,t if pNET,m,t < 0,
(19)
where π′FL,m,t is the new selling or buying price of the mi-
crogrid trader m at the scheduling time t after the adjustment,
and ∆πFL,m,t is the adjusted amount of the selling or buying
price of the microgrid trader m at the scheduling time t.
Step 4: The DSO aggregates the surplus demand or supply
of all microgrid traders, and determines the imbalance prices,
denoted as π⋆DSSP,t or π
⋆
DSBP,t, according to Eq. (17).
The flowchart of the procedures for the proposed Stackel-
berg game-theoretic problem is shown in Fig. 4.
B. Solution
To solve the Stackelberg game-theoretic problem, this re-
search develops an artificial immune algorithm as proposed
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Fig. 4. Flowchart of the procedures for the Stackelberg game-theoretic
problem between the leader (distribution system operator) and followers
(microgrid traders).
by [34]. This algorithm is able to search the entire feasible
spaces for decision variables, in order to find the global
optimal solutions. To illustrate the proposed algorithm, first,
decision variables and objective functions of the formulated
optimisation problems are defined as:
pF=[pDG,n,t, pEV,n,t,∆pS,n,t,∆dn,t, πFL,m,t] ,∀m∈M, n∈N ,
(20)
pL = [pNET,m,t, πDSSP,t, πDSBP,t] ,∀m∈M, (21)
fF = [−fp,m] ,∀m∈M, (22)
fL = [|fB|] , (23)
where pF is the vector containing the decision variables a
follower, pL is the vector containing the decision variables
from the leader, fF is the vector representing the objective
function of a follower, and fL is the vector representing the
objective function of the leader. In addition, the minimum and
maximum constraints of a follower are denoted by p
F
and
pF, respectively. The minimum and maximum constraints of
a leader are denoted by p
L
and pL, respectively.
Key concepts with respect to the artificial immune system
[35] are introduced as follows:
• Concept 1 (Antigen and Antibody): A vector which is





, is defined as an antigen, denoted as p.
The value of objective function of this antigen is defined as
an antibody, denoted as f (p). A group of generated antigens






where A is the set to denote the antigen population, and |A|
is the total number of the population set.
• Concept 2 (Clonal Process): To increase the diversity of
the antigens, the clonal process generates more antigens to








where|Amax| is the maximum size of the population, and ⌊·⌋
is the operation to obtain the floor function.
Using the clonal process, one antigen can be cloned by












where Ac is the set to denote the clonal population. Through
the clonal process, the population of antigens increases to
Amax = Ac ∪ A.
• Concept 3 (Pareto Dominance): For all f(pa) ∈ f (pa),
f(pb) ∈ f (pb), if f(pa) ≤ f(pb) and it has at least one strict
inequality, we have f (pa) dominates f (pb) within the feasible




, in which f (pb) is defined
as the dominated antibody.
• Concept 4 (Pareto Optimality): If the objective function
of a decision variable dominates the objective function of any
other decision variable, this decision variable is defined as the
Pareto optimality, denoted as p∗.
The proposed algorithm is implemented to solve the op-
timisation problems of both the DSO and multiple microgrid
traders over the horizon |T |. First, antigens are generated from
the feasible space to represent potential values of decision
variables. Second, each antigen is cloned to improve the
diversity and cover more potential solutions. Third, the domi-
nated antigens and antibodies are removed in every literation,
denoted as ιF and ιL for the leader and followers, respectively,
so as to remain the non-dominated antigens and antibodies.
Fourth, until the maximum number of the iteration, denoted
as ιmaxL and ι
max
F for the leader and followers, respectively,
is reached, the remaining non-dominated antibodies become
the Pareto optimality. The details the developed algorithm is
presented in Algorithm 1.
IV. CASE STUDIES
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the designed framework,
case studies were performed using the modified IEEE 69-
bus distribution system as presented in Fig. 5. The system
was separated into 6 microgrids. 15 solar photovoltaics and 6
dispatchable generators are arbitrarily allocated to 69 buses.
Each bus is taken as a load and equipped with a storage devices
and an electric vehicle.
Fig. 5. Modified IEEE 69-bus distribution system. The system is separated
into 6 microgrids. 15 solar photovoltaics and 6 dispatchable generators are
arbitrarily allocated to 69 buses. Each bus is taken as a load and equipped
with a storage devices and an electric vehicle.
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Algorithm 1 Solution algorithm to the Stackelberg game-
theoretic problem
Input: predicted generation and consumption for all micro-
grids
1: randomly initialise the population of antigens from the






as AL (0) ={
pL,1, ...,pL,|AL|
}
2: while ιL ≤ ιmaxL do
3: implement the clonal operation as (26), to increase the
population of antigens from |AL (ιL)| to |AmaxL |
4: remove dominated antigens and antibodies from the
population
5: while |AL (ιL)| > |AL| do
6: remove antigens and antibodies with the smallest
avidities as [36]
7: end while
8: AL (ιL + 1) = AL (ιL) , ιL = ιL + 1
9: end while
10: yield optimal solution p⋆L as the input of followers’
optimisation problems
11: randomly initialise the population of antigens from a






as AF (0) ={
pF,1, ...,pF,|AF|
}
12: while ιF ≤ ιmaxF do
13: implement the clonal operation as (26), to increase the
population of antigens from |AF (ιF)| to |AmaxF |
14: remove dominated antigens and antibodies from the
population
15: while |AF (ιF)| > |AF| do
16: remove antigens and antibodies with the smallest
avidities as [36]
17: AF (ιF + 1) = AF (ιF) , ιF = ιF+1
18: optimal solution p⋆F
19: end while
20: end while
21: while the supply or demand of microgrid traders is not
matched do
22: adjust selling or buying price by Eq. (19)
23: end while
Output: aggregated surplus supply or demand∑
m∈M p
⋆





The profile of energy consumption was sourced from the
residential consumers in England. The profile of solar genera-
tion was sourced from Renewables.ninja [37] with the installed
capacity of 1.5kW for each prosumer. The cost coefficients of
the dispatchable generator, vehicle-to-grid, and demand side
management are provided in TABLE I. Other parameters were







kWh, and ε=0.003. The simulations were programmed by the
Matlab and performed on a computer with Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-4770HQ CPU at 2.20 GHz.
A. Local Energy Balance
The aggregated inflexible power from the solar generation,
flexible power from the dispatchable generators, electric ve-
TABLE I
COST COEFFICIENTS OF THE DISPATCHABLE GENERATOR,
VEHICLE-TO-GRID, AND DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT
Dispatchable Generators Vehicle-to-Grid Demand Side Management
α (£/kWh2) 7.0×10−3 5.5×10−3 2.8×10−3
β (£/kWh) 1.8×10−3 1.6×10−3 1.6×10−3





































Fig. 6. The aggregated solar generation, flexible power, and consumption of
all prosumers for each microgrid. The x axes indicate the scheduling time.
The y axes indicate the power.
hicles, storage systems, and demand side management and
consumption for each microgrid is presented in Fig. 6. It can be
seen that the flexible power accounts for a majority portion of
the energy self-sufficiency for each microgrid, compared to the
solar generation. The microgrid 2, microgrid 4 and microgrid
5 can not only meet the demand of its own prosumers, but
also export the surplus energy to other microgrids or utility
grids. The negative flexible power is caused when the sum of
power charged to the storage systems and load shifting to this
time period is greater than the sum of dispatchable generation,
power discharged from the storage systems, power-to-grid of
electric vehicles, load shifting away from this time period, and
load curtailment.
Fig. 7 shows the aggregated net power of the distribution
network and imbalance price. The SSP is proportional to
the total net supply of the distribution network and SBP
is proportional to the total net demand of the distribution
network. The net supply can be exported to the utility grids
or curtailed. The net demand is satisfied by importing power
from the utility grids.
B. Transactive Energy Among Microgrids
The process of multiple microgrid traders cooperatively
trade energy with each other during the second scheduling
interval is presented in Fig. 8. During this time interval, the


















































Fig. 7. The aggregated net power of the distribution network and imbalance
price. The x-axis indicates the scheduling time. The positive value of left y-
axis indicates the surplus supply and negative value of left y-axis indicates
the surplus demand. The positive value of right y-axis indicates the system
sell price and negative value of right y-axis indicates the system buy price.
microgrid 1, microgrid 3, and microgrid 5 become sellers,
with the selling amount of 1.04 kW, 1.14 kW, and 2.10 kW,
respectively. The microgrid 2, microgrid 4, and microgrid 6
become buyers, with the buying amount of 1.74 kW, 3.47
kW, and 0.40 kW, respectively. Since the total demand of
buyers is higher than the total supply of sellers, when the
unmatched supply is cleared, the negotiation among microgrid
traders completes. It can be seen that the negotiation during
this scheduling interval converges within 3 iterations. The
initial trading volumes and prices are obtained by solving the
optimisation problem of each microgrid. At the first iteration,
the buyers (microgrid 2 and microgrid 6) buy the power from
the microgrid 3 at the agreed price of £0.056/kWh. The supply
of the microgrid 3 and demand of the microgrid 6 are cleared.
At the second iteration, the buyers (microgrid 2 and microgrid
4) buy the power from the microgrid 5 at the agreed price of
£0.069/kWh. The supply of the microgrid 5 and demand of
the microgrid 2 are cleared. At the third iteration, 1.05 kW of
demand of the microgrid 4 is further satisfied by the supply
of the microgrid 1 at the agreed price of £0.0642/kWh. The
supply of the microgrid 1 is cleared. The rest unmatched 1.32
kW of demand of the microgrid 4 is imported from the utility
grid at the SBP.
C. Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the proposed model in
terms of achieving the local energy balance, the following two
models are used as the comparison:
• Comparison 1 (The Model Without Flexibility Provision):
In this model, prosumers are only equipped with solar panels
as the inflexible generation source, without the flexibility
provided by dispatchable generators, storage devices, electric
vehicles, and flexible loads. Other settings are remained the
same as the proposed model.
• Comparison 2 (The Model Without Transactive Energy):
In this model, prosumers are unable to participate in the
























Fig. 8. Unmatched power supply or demand for the transactive energy among
microgrid traders. The x-axis indicates the number of iteration. The y-axis
indicates the unmatched power supply or demand.
transactive energy to exchange surplus supply or demand with
each other. The only option is to import or export energy from
or to the utility grids. Other settings are remained the same as
the proposed model.
The comparison of the net power of the distribution network
under these three models is presented in Fig. 9. Compared
to the model without the flexibility provision, our proposed
model can not only reduce the dependence on the utility grids,
but also export surplus power, whereas the model without the
flexibility provision has to rely on the power import from the
utility grids during the entire scheduling horizon. Compared to
the model without the transactive energy in which prosumers
can only import energy at the SBP higher than the price
determined by the transactive energy, and export energy at the
SSP lower than the price determined by the transactive energy,
our proposed model can achieve a better local energy balance
during the entire scheduling horizon. Incentivised by the prices
determined by the transactive energy, prosumers are willing
to increase the amount of flexibility provision during the
peak demand period from thirteenth to thirty-third scheduling
intervals, whereas decrease the amount of flexibility provision
during the rest scheduling intervals.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a framework of local energy mar-
kets to accommodate the emerging role of prosumers and
their DRESs. An ensemble of prosumers is structured in
the form of microgrids to collectively exchange energy with
other microgrids and provide flexibility to the utility grids.
The decision making and interactions between the DSO and
multiple microgrid traders are analysed using a Stackelberg
game-theoretic approach, by which a DSO seeks for local
energy balance by scheduling the operation of microgrids
and determining the imbalance prices, and multiple microgrid
traders seek for maximising the profits of their prosumers
through dispatching the flexibility sources and participating
in the transactive energy. Case studies show that the proposed
model is capable of achieving a better local energy balance
CSEE JOURNAL OF POWER AND ENERGY SYSTEMS, VOL. , NO. , MARCH 2015 9





















Fig. 9. Comparison of the net power of the distribution network for the
proposed model, the model without flexibility provision, and the model
without transactive energy. The x-axis indicates the scheduling time. The y-
axis indicates the net power.
and reducing the dependency on the utility grids. For future
work, the responsibilities of microgrid traders and prosumers,
e.g., the cost of using distribution networks, can be evaluated
from the regulatory perspective.
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